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Abstract 
 
 
Since their implementation at the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have become a 
widely used instrument of trade policy in agricultural trade. With almost 1300 TRQs sched-
uled at the WTO, it seems worthwhile to examine their economic effects more closely. This is 
what this paper does. First, the theoretical background of TRQs is examined. Then a short 
overview of the Uruguay Round as their institutional background is given. We demonstrate 
that official statistics, which do not count TRQs as non-tariff barriers, are at least highly mis-
leading. Very often, their effects are the same as those of regular quotas, including 
redistributive effects. The prominent example of the European Banana regime is used to 
illustrate all of these points.   
 
Keywords: Agriculture in International Trade, Commercial Policy, Protection, Promotion, 
Trade Negotiations 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) is regarded by many econo-
mists as a major progress in the international debate on trade liberalization. In all ear-
lier rounds under GATT, there had been the intention to liberalize agricultural trade but 
it had never been successful prior to the finalization of the URAA in 1994. The major 
policy decisions of the URAA include (i) the tariffication of nontariff barriers, (ii) the re-
duction of the level of agricultural protection in stages between 1995/1996 and 
2000/01, (iii) the reduction of agricultural subsidies, and (iv) the setting of a minimum 
access to the domestic agricultural markets of WTO members. With the decision on 
tariffication, important nontariff barriers in agriculture, like variable import levies are 
prohibited. Given this background, international organizations like OECD stress that the 
number of nontariff barriers has declined strongly since 1994 (OECD 1997, Table 8.1). 
There is the general impression by many economists that the decline in the level of 
protection was not yet very strong, but that the URAA was the first important step to-
wards a further reduction of trade distortions (JOSLING, TANGERMANN 1999). 
 
The actual liberalization steps, however, are combined with some substantial new non-
tariff trade barriers, at least if we define nontariff barriers meaningfully in economic 
terms. This point has been unobserved in the general economic debate and has only 
been discussed in detail by some agricultural economists. In some cases, no real tarif-
fication did occur as in the case of the EU grain policy (THOMPSON, HERRMANN, 
GOHOUT 2000). More importantly, the URAA has led to a very large number of tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs) (SKULLY 1999a, BOUGHNER, DE GORTER 1999). Many coun-
tries including the EU and the US introduced quotas besides the bound tariffs to fulfil 
the minimum access rule. Tariffication and quotification occured simultaneously. In 
many cases, there is considerable "water in the tariff" and the quota component is bind-
ing. Quota rents occur then like under traditional nontariff barriers, although TRQs are 
counted like tariffs under the WTO rules. 
 
Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to show the importance of TRQs 
in agricultural trade under the URAA and to elaborate economic impacts of agricultural 
TRQs. The theory of agricultural TRQs is presented in Section 2 and it is shown how 
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the administration of the TRQs affects their economic impacts. It is then summarized in 
Section 3 how decisions on agricultural trade liberalization fostered the introduction of 
TRQs. In Section 4, we show for the Common Market Organization for Bananas 
(CMOB) how the administration of TRQs affected the economic impacts. The CMOB is 
particularly interesting as it led to an international trade dispute and general rules on 
the use of the TRQs were specified by two WTO Panels on Bananas. In Section 5, a 
summary is given and conclusions are drawn. 
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2 THEORY OF AGRICULTURAL TRQs 
 
This section examines the economic impacts of TRQs from a theoretical perspective. It 
aims to show that TRQs contain characteristics both of quantitative restrictions and 
tariffs, either one of which can prevail depending on the particular market setting. In 
particular, if a TRQ is in fact a quota, rents typically accrue. Since the underlying cause 
of these rents is, of course, the rationing of supply, the problem arises how the result-
ing excess demand is to be administered. This administrative choice together with 
competitive conditions at the different stages of the marketing chain determine the dis-
tribution of quota rent. In this section, however, we will abstract from the latter and fo-
cus just on the administrative aspects.  
The three main components of a TRQ are the first-tier or in-quota tariff, the second-tier 
or out-of quota tariff and the quota itself, which limits up to which quantity the lower 
first-tier tariff is applied. These three characteristics modify the excess supply function 
and determine, along with the  excess demand function, whether the quota is binding, 
i.e. whether the main economic effect of the TRQ is that of a quantitative restriction.  
 
 
Figure 1:  TRQs Under Different Demand Conditions 
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This situation is illustrated by the demand curve D1, which intersects the supply curve 
in the inelastic section of its characteristic kink. Under these demand conditions, the 
second-tier tariff is prohibitive and the equilibrium price p1 and quantity q1=Q are identi-
cal to those of a pure quota Q. This is evidently the third-best solution compared to the 
free-trade situation A, but also compared to a situation where only t1 is applied, B. The 
then resulting loss in welfare is the shaded triangle. From the perspective of the suppli-
ers, however, the quota is preferable. The loss in producer surplus due to the reduction 
in quantity (the lower part of the HARBERGER triangle) is clearly outweighed by the 
quota rent (the long shaded rectangle) which results from the quantitative restriction. 
Quota rent is therefore defined here as the premium which results only from the intro-
duction of the quota, that is the price difference compared to the tariff-only situation. 
Consequently, individual low-cost suppliers can have a higher profit margin over their 
marginal costs due to their higher producer surplus per unit. Under different demand 
conditions, the quota might not be binding. With low excess demand the resulting equi-
librium with p2 and q2 is the same as it would be in a tariff-only situation, implying that 
no quota rents accrue.  
 
In the situation illustrated by D3, the quota is not binding either, but this time the reason 
is that excess supply is very high. In contrast to the previous case, however, rents do 
accrue.1 The reason for this is that only the low tariff t1 is charged for the first Q imports. 
Therefore, the problem arises which suppliers are granted the right to import under 
these favorable conditions, since these are willing to supply q3, but only for Q is t1 ap-
plicable. Consequently, the excess demand in Q must be somehow administered, 
whether the quota is binding as in case 1 or no longer binding as is the case here. The 
possible administrative choices will be outlined in the next paragraphs, but before it 
should be noted that this case 3 is the only constellation where it can justifiably be ar-
gued that TRQs are welfare improving compared to a pure quota. The welfare gain is 
illustrated in the figure by the striped triangle below D3. 
 
When it comes to TRQ administration, one has to distinguish the distribution of quota 
shares from the distribution of licenses. The first determines which quantities are re-
served for particular exporting countries, whereas the second defines a rule according 
                                                 
1 They are even higher than in case 1, because the price increase due to the quota, i.e. the 
difference between p3 and the price in C (if only t1 was charged) is larger. 
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to which licenses that enable individual traders to import under the quota are distrib-
uted. 
 
If the importing country just sets Q, t1 and t2, this is referred to as a global quota. As-
suming first that the licensing regime is efficient, the distribution of imports with respect 
to their origin is then determined by market forces. That is, the most cost-efficient pro-
ducers are those who get to import under the quota such that above figure is an accu-
rate representation of actual market conditions.  
 
Country-specific allocations are quota shares that the importing country reserves for 
specific exporting countries. The introduction of these can lead, irrespective of the li-
censing regime, to inefficiencies, because each favored country does not have to com-
pete with others within its quota share. The only restriction it faces is that it has to sup-
ply below the equilibrium price. This can be seen in Figure 2: As a reference situation, 
we use situation 1 from Figure 1 where we have a binding global quota Q with an equi-
librium of q1 and p1. In Figure 2, however, country B does not fill its quota share QB 
because for quantities exceeding qB, marginal costs exceed the equilibrium price p 
prevailing at the quantity q (quantity q is the sum of the effective export quantities qA, qB 
and qC). This underfill causes the price to rise beyond the equilibrium price p1 of the 
global quota of Figure 1 which was implicity assumed to be open to all exporting coun-
tries, not just to countries A, B and C. One can also see that those quantities that lie 
between qB* and qB and between qC* and qC could not be imported under a global 
quota: For these quantities, marginal costs are higher than p* which corresponds to the 
lower kink of the effective supply curve of Figure 1. These quantities correspond to 
points on S0 + t1 to the right of q1 where marginal costs are higher than p* but lower 
than p1. For part of these quantities, countries B and C cannot realize quota rents due 
to their high marginal costs.  
 
So it can be concluded that country-specific allocations can have the effect that more 
efficient suppliers are driven out of the import market in favor of less efficient suppliers. 
If the favored suppliers can fill their quota, this inefficient allocation – as compared to a 
global quota – is at the expense of the more efficient suppliers and at the expense of 
potential rents. If the favored suppliers cannot even fill their quota, the consumer lose 
as well: The import quantity is even lower and the price even higher than it would be 
under a global quota. 
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Figure 2: Effects of Country-Specific Allocations 
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right to issue export certificates (or export licenses)2 to their discretion and the whole-
sale traders of the importing country do not have bargaining power due to monopolies 
or oligopolies. Often, however, the importing country will wish to favor local traders as 
well. Then it can issue import licenses and either decree that an importer has to match 
an import license with an export certificate or that presenting an import license is the 
only requirement for importing under the quota. In the first case, the rights to rents are 
allocated both to exporters and importers, in the second obviously just to importers. As 
mentioned above, competitive conditions determine to what extent administratively 
allocated rights to rents transform into actual rents.  
There are five possible rules that determine the distribution of import licenses (For a 
more detailed account, see SKULLY 1999a).  
 
1. Historical Allocation Rule: Licenses are distributed according to past trade patterns. 
Most often, the available quantities are distributed proportionally to the importers’ 
average import quantities of a past reference period. Consequently, market new-
comers have to import out-of-quota first in order to be included in future license al-
location procedures. As with the allocation of quota shares, the main disadvantage 
of this rule is that changing market conditions are hard to take into account, be it for 
political reasons or because of identification problems. 
 
2. First-come, first-served: Import licenses are issued for import quantities in the order 
of their arrival at the border until the quota is filled. In this case, geographical loca-
tion becomes a factor of "competitiveness", specially if the commodity or goods in 
question are perishable. Even if they aren’t, resources are very often wasted for 
storage right at the border in order to make sure to be there on time when the im-
port period is opened. 
 
3. License on Demand: If demand is too low to fill the quota, there is no difference to 
first-come, first-served. Otherwise all requests for licenses are collected and re-
duced proportionally to adjust the requested quantity to the available quantity q. So 
if it is commonly known that demand for licenses exceeds availability, there is a 
clear  incentive for strategically overstating one’s true demand. Unless there is a 
uniform propensity to overstate, this will add further distortions. 
                                                 
2 There does not seem to be a consistent distinction between these terms. Here we use the 
terms interchangeably.  
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4. Discretionary methods: The right to issue import licenses is delegated to state trad-
ing companies which can distribute these between their members according to in-
ternal rules. Rules that make the availability of licenses dependent upon certain at-
tributes of the imported commodity are also an example of discretionary "methods".  
 
5. Auctions: Who gets how many licenses is determined by market mechanisms. As-
suming that the auction itself is efficient, i.e. that there is enough liquidity in the 
market – this is often a problem in real life – and that the rules of the game are 
transparent to all market participants, this is the most efficient allocation method. 
Assuming also that bargaining power is evenly distributed, the quota will be filled by 
the most efficient suppliers, because these have the widest margin in ability to bid. 
From the perspective of the government, another advantage of auctions is that they 
create public revenue up to the whole amount of rents. If this is used to provide 
public goods or lower the taxes, this distribution will probably be judged more equi-
table by most people than if importing firms get a nice markup for free or for lobby-
ing best or having the best location. Consequently, in this case licenses are not 
really "rights to rents" any more, but only "rights to import".  
 
Obviously, some combinations of quota share allocations with licensing rules make 
more sense than others: If first-come, first-served is an elegant way to avoid the politi-
cally sensitive decision which export countries should be favored, it makes little sense 
to allocate country-specific quota shares first. But since licenses operate at a micro 
level while quota allocation is still in the macro department, all combinations are possi-
ble and offer policy makers a wide range of control regulations.  
 
To sum up, it is this combination of the allocation of quota shares with a licensing re-
gime that determines welfare effects in terms of traditional allocative efficiency criteria 
as well as of transaction costs. The latter will vary not just in quantity but also in quality: 
The costs of organizing an auction will generally be accepted as necessary while rent 
seeking or plain corruption less so. Evidently, different rules have different implications 
for the resulting income distribution between foreign producers and traders and local 
traders and state authorities. In the end, however, the consumer always loses.  
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3 THE ROLE OF TRQs IN THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
 
With the signature of the Marrakech Agreement that led to the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, the most recent negotiation round of the 
GATT finished. The Uruguay Round (UR), named after the country that hosted the Min-
isterial meeting at the beginning of the negotiations, stood under the heading of trade 
liberalization and the reduction of the nontariff trade barriers (NTB) towards expansion 
of the world trade in agricultural products. The basic objectives were the limitation of 
protectionism and quantitative restrictions (QRs), the reduction of tariffs as well as the 
strengthening of the role of the multilateral trading system through the establishment of 
the WTO.  
 
The high protection level in industrialized countries has been a major issue in various 
GATT rounds over many years. No consensus on a real policy change could be 
reached, however, before the UR. In the UR, agricultural trade liberalization became 
crucial for the success of the negotiation package. It was the first time that the partici-
pants agreed upon an autonomous agreement for agriculture. A most helpful overview 
of the role of the agricultural sector in the multilateral trading system is provided by 
JOSLING, TANGERMANN and WARLEY.  
 
 
3.1 The Agreement on Agriculture 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture is an additional agreement for agricultural trade in the 
GATT. The GATT on the other hand is one of several sections of the Marrakech 
Agreement to the establishment of the WTO.  
 
The Agreement on Agriculture comprises three topics called market access, export 
subsidies and domestic support. They were crucial in the negotiation process. Under 
the concept of market access measures like quotas, tariffs (specific or ad-valorem), 
administrative regulations etc., that can distort or prevent trade flows, were discussed. 
Export subsidies appear in the extent to which governments dispose surplus agricul-
tural production on world markets. The term domestic support refers to measures that 
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operate like producer subsidies. The structure of the signed agreement is very com-
plex. Under the GATT that deals with trade of goods, the Agreement on Agriculture is 
located as a so-called additional agreement (WTO 1998). It includes the contract text of 
only 26 of the altogether 500 pages of the legal framework (JOSLING,  TANGER-
MANN, WARLEY 1996). It nevertheless led to extensive changes in the world agricul-
tural trade. The real dimension that this relative by small part occupies becomes clear if 
the 20,000 pages of schedules of market access commitments are considered. The 
details of the implementation of the agreements for individual countries  were laid down 
there.  
 
The objective of the negotiations over agriculture was "…to establish a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system…" (WTO 1994). The regulation on a minimum 
access measured as percentage of domestic consumption should ensure access to all 
domestic markets where there had been no or very little imports at all before. At the 
same time, it was to be avoided to cut the already existing access (current access) to 
the national markets through the implementation of the above mentioned goals. A 
fundamental part of these efforts was the transformation of all NTB into tariffs and taxes, 
a process called tariffication (JOSLING, TANGERMANN, WARLEY 1996). The current 
protection should become more transparent and should constitute a basis for further 
liberalization efforts. It was also expected that tariffs would be less destabilizing for 
world agricultural markets than nontariff barriers with a zero price transmission 
elasticity. The members agreed on a calculation method that should transform all 
nontariff measures into tariff protection. These tariffs became bound and should be 
reduced by 36 % on a simple (unweighted) average basis, with a minimum rate of 15 % 
for each tariff line. The procedure of tariffication was quite simple. Each member should 
measure the price differences between the internal market prices and world market 
prices during the basis period 1986-1988 on its own. The degrees of freedom in the 
calculation method were very high. The chosen reference basis period with high price 
gaps between internal and external market price and the chosen qualities for 
calculating were relatively "generous".3 Economists speak in this context of "dirty 
tariffication" or "water in the tariff".  
                                                 
3 Sometimes, they compared the world market prices with intervention prices that were nor-
mally higher than the actual prices.  
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Table 1:  Structure of the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Type of rule Market Access 
Base: 1986-1988 
Price Tariffication of nontariff trade barriers 
 
Reduction of all tariffs by 36 % average (till 2000 in annual steps) 
(minimum of 15 % for a single tariff) 
Quantity Minimum access commitments: 
3 % of domestic consumption (1995), growing to 5 % ( till 2000) 
 
Current access maintained 
Other Special safeguard provisiona 
 
a = Special safeguard provisions were introduced for products that have undergone tariffication, 
which allow importers to guard against import surges and low world prices. 
 
Source:  
JOSLING, TANGERMANN, WARLEY 1996, p. 178. 
 
 
The calculated high tariffs revealed the actual amount of protection on the markets. In 
some cases tariffs restricted trade more strongly than in the reference period.4 
Sometimes tariffs were prohibitive. In order to avoid conflicts with duty to grant 
minimum market access, complementary methods were searched for. The 
establishment of TRQs emerged as a compromise between tariffication and market 
access improvement on this occasion (ABBOTT, MORSE 1999). They should keep the 
market access open like channels for trade flows through the barrier of the bound new 
tariffs.  
 
The individual member states bound themselves to the establishment of TRQs. 
Extraordinarily many TRQs were implemented with the tariffication due to the broad 
variety of products combined with the large number of members of the WTO. A total of 
35 countries have scheduled 1370 TRQs for agricultural commodities in the Agreement 
(BOUGHNER, DE GORTER 1999). There is, however, no uniform distribution in the 
                                                 
4 The reference period is the time period before the implementation of the entered obligations 
of the UR.  
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newly created TRQs across the WTO members. For example, relatively few developing 
countries have adopted TRQs (ABBOTT, MORSE 1999).  
 
Under certain circumstances, TRQs can show characteristics of protectionism as 
illustrated in Section 2. ANDERSON (1999) portrays the poor characteristics of TRQs 
on this occasion very beautifully. They can lead to the legitimation of state trading 
agencies, to the generation of quota rents, to the discrimination of producers 
(countries) and to the reduction on overall loss in welfare. These are all effects that 
were not in the spirit of the UR negotiations. Consequently, the WTO wished to find 
mechanisms of TRQ administration which would  prevent these negative side effects. 
Unfortunately, the practical implementation did not succeed in realizing this objective.  
 
 
3.2 The Distribution of TRQs 
 
With respect to the practical distribution of the TRQs, several points should be kept in 
mind. Within its basic principles, GATT regulates the administration of quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) with Article XIII (SKULLY 1999a), which are not allowed anymore. 
Under the WTO definition, TRQs are legally and technically no QRs, nevertheless 
Article XIII applies here. The general procedures are not located explicitly in the 
Agreements but in the "Agreement on Modalities". Although this agreement never 
became binding (HUDEC 1998), it summarizes basic rules5  for TRQs administration.  
 
Article XIII "Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions" offers 
different methods of TRQ distribution.  
"In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall… as closely as 
possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in 
the absence of such restrictions…" or "… may seek agreement with respect to the 
allocation of shares in the quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial 
interest in supplying the product concerned" (WTO 1994). 
 
Several problems emerge with the implementation of this article. For example it seems 
to be impossible to determine those countries with a "substantial interest" or to find a 
                                                 
5 The basic rules summarizes general regulations like the amount of the minimum access or 
the low in-quota tariff. No general formula, however, was fixed for the calculation of this low 
or minimal in-quota tariff.  
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base period for the calculation of the trade shares, etc. SKULLY (1999a) called Article 
XIII a "sickly child". He claims that it advocates non-discrimination as well as 
discrimination. For example, non-discrimination with respect to the distribution of QRs 
should reflect the situation as closely as possible as is to be expected in the absence of 
TRQs. On the other hand, if exporter shares are found to be discriminating due to 
changing economic conditions, then these can be reallocated without compensation. A 
detailed discussion of these regulations can be found in BOUGHNER and DE 
GORTER as well as in SKULLY (1999a).  
 
The basic rules from the "Agreement on Modalities" describe the administrative design 
of TRQs, which the individual members should implement. They make a general 
distinction between quotas for "minimum access" and "current access", which are both 
elements of the efforts concerning market access. They appear in form of TRQs, which 
admit imports of certain quantities at reduced tariff rates (JOSLING, TANGERMANN, 
WARLEY 1996). 
 
Current access quotas should be established on markets on which the tariffication had 
taken place and where the high bound tariffs would lead to a worsening of the access 
possibilities compared with a fixed base period fixed previously (see above). The fixed 
quantity should nearly equal the import quantity of the basis period of 1986-88.  
 
Minimum access quotas, however, should secure a certain minimum market access. If 
imports were small or nil before the UR, market access should be established. The size 
of the corresponding TRQs should  enable imports of at least 3 percent of the national 
consumption of the basis period 1986-88 and will be increased up to 5 percent in 2000 
(JOSLING, TANGERMANN, WARLEY 1996). 
 
Generally, the current access TRQs are meant to preserve the existing market access 
and can be introduced as country-specific quotas (JOSLING, TANGERMANN, 
WARLEY 1996). The distribution can therefore reflect the historically developed trade 
flows.  
 
Obviously, previous trade flows cannot be the orientation for the creation of the new 
market access. Its distribution should be based only on the MFN principle on non-
discrimination (JOSLING, TANGERMANN, WARLEY 1996).  
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The rules for the administration of TRQs do not form a strict framework for the 
distribution of TRQs and leave very much scope for interpretation through the national 
authorities. In the implementation of Article XIII, the structural deficits of the WTO 
(GATT) regulations become clear. The GATT is a rule-based agreement for trade 
which needs consensus in the negotiations. It is no wonder that structural deficits occur 
on this occasion. The general rules of the agreement on the other hand need 
explanations and exceptions for interpretation. Often, these rules can not be translated 
without recourse to additional information, explaining their purpose (HUDEC 1998). 
Consequently, it is not surprising that inconsistent options occurred in the case of the 
GATT in the context of TRQs. "Instead of advocating one principle of distributive justice 
and proscribing all others, Article XIII allows a conflicting set of distributive principles to 
co-exist" (SKULLY 1999b).  
 
The WTO in its efforts is interested in an expansion and support of the world 
agricultural trade. It is, however, primarily interested in the distribution and extent of 
trade quantities and less in the distribution of quota rents emerging hereby (SKULLY 
1999a). However, politicians who formulate economic and trade policy and 
corresponding administrative regulations are very much interested in the distribution of 
rents. Normally licenses must be distributed along with the allocation of the quotas. The 
distributive effects depend strongly on these two questions. The decision who gets the 
right to export or import, can also determine which firm receives the "right to import". 
There are no specific provision for the allocation methods of import licences 
(BOUGHNER, DE GORTER 1999). 
 
With the distribution of the quotas, one determines the trade direction and trade 
quantity. The rents, however, are distributed primarily with the distribution of licenses. 
The above mentioned options from Article XIII GATT apply for the administrative regu-
lation of quota distribution. The TRQs  for minimum access should be distributed on the 
basis of the MFN principle.6 In the ideal case, they would be created for all members 
(erga omnes) in the form of a global quota (TANGERMANN 1996). This theoretical 
idea opposes the practical design within the negotiation. So, some of the minimum 
access TRQs were created with more or less strong consent of the other WTO 
members as country-specific current access TRQs (TANGERMANN 1996). An 
example is the erga omnes quota for corn into the EC, whose administrative design 
was chosen  such that the USA are beneficiaries of the quota tender.  
                                                 
6 Article I: "…any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties" (GATT 1986,  p. 2). 
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4 HOW THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRQs AFFECTS THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS: LESSON FROM THE BANANA CASE 
 
4.1 Background and Rules of the CMOB 
 
The Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) is based on a TRQ system. It 
is, however, in several ways different from most other TRQs in agriculture. TRQs have 
not been introduced as a consequence of the decisions on "tariffication" and minimum 
market access under the URAA. Their origin was the Single European Act of 1993, 
which led to a common market policy departing from differential national policies of the 
individual EU member countries. 
 
The CMOB was introduced in 1993 and two major changes of the system ocurred 
since then. Table 2 summarizes the main features of those three systems. The CMOB 
contains several of the elements of a TRQ system, which were discussed in Section 2, 
but it is more differentiated than the textbook case discussed in Figure 1. There are two 
different quotas which we call the ACP quota and the MFN quota. The ACP quota is 
reserved for imports from ACP countries, i.e. African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
which are granted preferential access to the EU markets according to the Convention 
of Lomé. The size of this quota is 857,700 mt and exports of individual ACP countries 
within this quota may not exceed pre-CMOB levels. The MFN quota covers EU imports 
from third countries. It has increased from originally 2 million metric tons to now 
2,553,000 tons, and the so-called dollar banana exports from Latin American countries 
to the EU account for the major share of this quota. 
 
A highly complex import licensing scheme was introduced to ration the scarce MFN 
quota, whereas the ACP quota has traditionally not been filled. Under the MFN quota, 
rationing took place according to operator categories first. These depended on the 
source of previously marketed bananas. Traders who had marketed dollar bananas 
were categorized as category A operators. B operators were those who had marketed 
EU or ACP bananas. Category C operators were newcomers. 66.5 %, 30 % and 3.5 % 
of the licenses were reserved for category A, B and C operators respectively. Sec-
ondly, quantities were allocated according to activity functions to primary importers, 
secondary importers and ripeners who received 57 %, 15 % and 28 % respectively. 
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The result was a highly discretionary system based on historical criteria. Some flexibil-
ity to the scheme was introduced as the licenses have always been tradeable apart 
from restrictions to newcomers. 
 
 
Table 2:  Overview of the CMOB: 1993 to Present  
 
Regime Original Common Mar-
ket Regime 
1993-1994 
BFA-Reform 
 
1995-1998 
WTO-Ruling Reform 
 
1999-Present 
Country-Category ACP MFN ACP MFN ACP MFN 
Quota Allocation  
Country-
Specific 
Allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global 
Quota 
 
Country-
Specific 
Allocation 
~ 50% 
Country-
Specific 
Allocation 
for BFA 
Signatories;
~ 50 % 
Global  
Quota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Quota 
~ 90% Country-Specific 
Quota for Substantial 
Suppliers; 
~ 10 % 
Global Quota ("others") 
Country-Specific 
Quota Transfer 
   Partly Trans-
ferable 
 No Transfer-ability 
Quantities 857,700 t 2,000,000 ta 
(1993) 
2,200,000 ta 
(1995) 
857,700 t 2,553,000 ta 857,700 t 2,553,000 ta  
 
1st tier 0 ECU/t b 100 ECU/t b, c 0 ECU/t 75 ECU/t c 0 ECU/t 75 ECU/t c Tariffs 
2nd tier 750 ECU/t b 850 ECU/t b, c 722 ECU/t 822 ECU/t c 537ECU/t 737 ECU/t c, d 
License Regime  Operator 
Categories 
 + 
Activity 
Functions 
 Operator 
Categories 
 + 
Activity 
Functions 
 Distinction only: Tradi-
tional Operators and 
Newcomers 
 
a = Including non-traditional; b = green ECU; c = The tariffs for traditional ACP imports apply 
also to non-traditional imports from ACP countries within the MFN quota; d = Will be reduced to 
680 ECU/t as negotiated in the Uruguay-Round. 
 
Source: 
HERRMANN, KRAMB, MÖNNICH (1999), p. 3. 
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Table 2 indicates that in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs are lower for ACP than for third 
countries. The second-tier tariff has been much higher than the first-tier tariff since the 
very beginning of the CMOB. The administration of TRQs, however, strongly changed 
from the first to the second and third CMOB. Both changes occurred under the pres-
sure of WTO Panel Reports which found inconsistencies of the CMOB with WTO 
rules.7 The Banana Framework Agreement (BFA), which entered into force in 1995, 
can be regarded as a compromise between the EU and the four Latin American coun-
tries Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua and Venezuela. These four countries were as-
signed 23.4 %, 21 %, 3 % and 2 % of the total MFN quota respectively and could issue 
export certificates for up to 70 % of their country quota. The  other 50.6 % of the MFN 
quota remained a global quota. 
 
A Panel Report found, in 1997, several inconsistencies of the CMOB, in particular of its 
licensing regime, with WTO rules. It was generally found that separate regimes, i.e. two 
separate quotas, are not allowed. Furthermore, it was criticized that some but not all 
non-substantial suppliers had been allocated country-specific shares, for instance ACP 
countries and Venezuela and Nicaragua. The fact that category B operators had been 
exempted from the requirement of presenting export certificates was also objected. 
This led to a second change of the CMOB. 
 
The 1999 CMOB introduced again some substantial changes of the rules, e.g. with 
regard to the licensing system. Operator categories and activity functions have been 
abolished. Now there is only a distinction between traditional operators and newcom-
ers. For traditional operators, there is a so-called single-pot license-allocation proce-
dure, which means that no matter under which quota bananas have been previously 
imported, these quantities establish reference quantities for the allocation of licenses 
for imports under the MFN quota. More than 90 % of the MFN quota are now allocated 
to the substantial suppliers Colombia (23 %), Costa Rica (26 %), Ecuador (26 %) and 
Panama (16 %). The remaining 9 % are a global quota for which non-substantial sup-
pliers compete, irrespective of their origin being an ACP country or not. Export certifi-
cates are not involved any more. 
 
Again, a Panel Report found ongoing inconsistencies with WTO rules in April 1999 and 
the European Commission formulated in November 1999 a two-step plan to return to a 
tariff-only policy until 2006 (WTO 1999; EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1999). 
                                                 
7 A much more detailed analysis of changes in the CMOB is provided by HERRMANN, 
KRAMB, MÖNNICH (1999). 
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4.2 Economic Impacts of the CMOB and Its Administration 
 
Figure 1 has shown the basic microeconomics of TRQs and Figure 2 has illustrated 
some additional impacts of quota allocation and licensing, i.e. the administration of 
TRQs. These considerations are now extended for the case of the CMOB. Figure 3 
presents some basic economic impacts of the CMOB on the European market for ba-
nana imports from third countries. The market segment for EU and ACP bananas is not 
explicitly considered. We posit perfect competition and the large-country assumption 
for the EU as a whole on the world banana market.8 
 
Some elements of Figure 3 deviate strongly from the textbook presentation of Figure 1. 
We compare the existing situation with TRQs with a free-trade situation rather than with 
a tariff-only policy. This seems plausible as free trade has been the pre-CMOB frame-
work at least for individual EU countries like Germany. Moreover, free trade can usually 
be regarded as the first-best policy benchmark. We also include middlemen in the mar-
keting channel, which is important when allocative and redistributive impacts of the 
CMOB are derived. The stage of the marketing chain considered is the import stage.  
 
Typically, at the import stage, multinational fruit companies offer bananas to European 
wholesalers or ripeners. S stands for the supply curve of multinational fruit companies 
at the EU border. It can be thought of an excess supply curve of dollar bananas from 
the rest of the world within a two-region model. In a competitive marketing chain, the S 
curve is derived by adding marginal transport, ripening and marketing costs to marginal 
costs of exporters in the exporting countries. The latter is characterized by the supply 
curve SEXP. As far as parallel shifts are involved between S and SEXP, we can derive the 
aggregate welfare changes of producers and the consumers in the exporting countries 
along the S curve. D is the import demand curve, which indicates the willingness to pay 
of wholesalers and ripeners for banana imports at the EU border. In a competitive mar-
keting chain, D is derived from the consumers' willingness to pay for bananas at the 
retail level. If the demand curves at the retail and import stages are parallel, we can 
interpret welfare changes along the D curve as changes in consumer surplus. Under 
free trade, the market would be cleared with a quantity q0 and an import price p0. 
                                                 
8 These assumptions are not empirically tested here. For a test of alternative market conduct 
hypotheses on the German banana market prior to the introduction of the CMOB, see 
HERRMANN, SEXTON (1999). 
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Figure 3: Economic Impacts of the CMOB on the European Market for Banana  
 Imports from Third Countries (Assumptions: Perfect Competition; Large 
 Country) 
 
 
 
Under the CMOB, a global quota q1 is fixed. Additionally, a two-part tariff is introduced: 
t0 on all imports up to the quota and (t0 + t1) as a prohibitive tariff rate above the quota. 
The administration of TRQs involves import licenses, as under the CMOB of 1993 and 
1999. This leads to the kinked export supply curve S` with a vertical part between p2 
and p3. S` now intersects D at p1. Thus, the tariff-rate quota raises the import price from 
p0 to p1 and restricts imports from q0 to q1. 
 
What are the welfare implications of the CMOB on the European banana market? 
European consumers lose the area (a + e) in consumer surplus as a result of rising 
prices. A part of the price rise is due to the introduction of the tariff t0. A budgetary gain 
by the area (c + d) arises at the EU level. Additionally, quota rents occur on the Euro-
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pean market for traders in the magnitude of the area (a + b), since licenses and there-
fore rights to rents are distributed to importers. Prices rise stronger than in the pure 
tariff case and the restricted quantity can be sold at the highest bid, i.e. at p1 rather 
than p2. A net loss for producers and consumers in the exporting countries arises if 
world prices are transmitted to their domestic markets. The global quota is offered by 
traders, i.e. multinational firms, at the EU border at marginal costs MC1. If marginal 
costs of transporting, ripening and marketing from the exporting country to the EU bor-
der are subtracted, producer and consumer prices in exporting countries decline to 
pEXP. The welfare loss for exporting countries, which is the net loss of producers and 
consumers, can be measured by the area (b + c + d + f). Thus, the TRQ policy on the 
European banana market has led to welfare losses of European consumers and in 
third-countries, in particular for producers, which overcompensate the sum of quota 
rents by traders and EU budgetary gains. A net welfare loss of area (e + f) occurs on 
the European banana market for imports from third countries. 
 
This net welfare loss is an aggregate worldwide loss arising from the change on the 
European market. The analysis is much more difficult if we ask for the CMOB´s net 
welfare effect from the European point of view. A decision has to be made then how to 
account for quota rents of multinational firms. If quota rents are calculated as profits of 
European branches of those firms, they are part of the European welfare effect. If they 
are transferred back to their home countries, they are part of the non-European welfare 
effect.9 
 
The welfare and redistributive effects are now dependent both on the core policy pa-
rameters of the TRQ system like the size of the global quota, the magnitude of the first- 
and second-tier tariffs and on the determinants of TRQ administration, e.g. the licens-
ing scheme. The size of the global quota, e.g., determines the actual price under the 
TRQ policy and, hence, the magnitude of the welfare loss. The net welfare loss due to 
the CMOB is generally higher the more restrictive the global quota for dollar-banana 
exporters. The global quota also determines all redistributive effects. The smaller the 
global quota, the larger is the loss in consumer surplus, and the loss of producer sur-
plus in the exporting countries and the lower is the budgetary gain at the EU level. 
                                                 
9 The story could become even more complicated if profits of multinational firms would be 
addressed to the respective shareholders. Quota rents may then be spread all over the 
world. 
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Whether the quota rent increases or decreases with a reduction of the global quota, 
depends on the price elasticity of import demand. 
 
The administration of TRQs may affect the size of the quota rent and, thus, the net wel-
fare effect. One case in point is that the distribution of import licenses is usually not 
oriented at marginal costs. Under the original rules of the CMOB, the shares of opera-
tor categories in the license allocation did not coincide with trade patterns in a hypo-
thetical free-trade situation. The license share of category B importers was too high 
relative to category A importers. This caused an intensive trade with licenses. Due to 
the initial allocation and the price of quotas, quota rents and income were redistributed 
from higher- to lower-cost importers and also across traders and countries. Welfare 
losses were caused, too, as additional transaction costs in license trading occurred. As 
far as category B importers sticked to their licenses, new business relationships with 
dollar-banana exporters had to be built up, i.e. additional transaction costs were cre-
ated. The existence of transaction costs diminshed the overall size of the quota rent, 
i.e. the area (a + b) captured by importers, and increased the overall welfare loss due 
to the CMOB. 
 
Whereas these latter conclusions are similar for the CMOB of 1999, the TRQ admini-
stration under the BFA of 1995 differed substantially from the third and the first system. 
Consequently, the implications for allocation and redistribution were very different. 
When export licenses are issued as was the case under the BFA by the four priviliged 
dollar-banana exporters Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua and Venezuela, rights to 
rents are allocated at least to some exporting countries. Those exporting countries will 
then receive a part of the quota rent that was fully captured by traders in the situation 
without export licensing. Thus, exporting countries can regain their original welfare loss 
at the expense of multinational firms or European traders. Beyond the redistributive 
effects, allocative impacts on the export side are likely. Under the BFA, rights to rents 
were given to some countries, which enjoyed preferential treatment on the political 
market. In terms of TRQ administration, these are discretionary methods of country-
specific allocation. Typically, such a country-specific allocation is not conform with dif-
ferences in marginal costs and implies that the overall quantity is produced at higher 
costs. The net welfare loss of a TRQ policy additionally increases compared with the 
situation of Figure 3. 
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We have not yet touched some important questions which determine the impacts of 
TRQ administration. It can be shown that welfare impacts of TRQs are different from 
those of Figure 3 if imperfect competition rather than perfect competition holds. One 
empirical study of  the European banana market claimed that certainly the market 
structure is imperfectly competitive and also that market conduct on one selected mar-
ket, i.e. Germany, is imperfectly competitive (DEODHAR, SHELDON 1995). It has 
been shown recently that the result of significant market power is contingent upon the 
authors` econometric model. An improved model specification shows that market con-
duct on the German banana market was very close to competition (HERRMANN, 
SEXTON 1999). A further important question in the assessment of the CMOB is that 
the national and the EU points of view should be distinguished. This is due to the fact 
that redistributive effects occur within each Common Agricultural Policy as a conse-
quence of the Common Financial System (KOESTER 1977). These different views 
have been elaborated and quantitatively assessed elsewhere (HERRMANN 1999).  
 
Given these arguments, we can draw some important policy conclusions: 
 
1. The analysis has shown that the general parameters of TRQ policy as well as TRQ 
administration under the CMOB have induced an aggregate welfare loss on the regu-
lated market for bananas. One major element of this welfare loss is a high reduction of 
consumer surplus. 
 
2. Additionally, the redistributive impacts of  the CMOB are hidden and inconsistent 
with the stated goals of the policy. The main objective of the CMOB is to guarantee EU 
and ACP producers of bananas remunerative earnings at reasonable consumer prices 
(EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1993). This implies that distortions on the most important mar-
ket segment, i.e. the market for imports from third countries, are accepted in order to 
realize objectives on the small segment of EU and ACP bananas. The transfer effi-
ciency of this policy can be rated as being extremely low. 
 
3. Apart from being not directly observable, the redistributive impacts of the CMOB 
were also large in their magnitude. Figure 3 suggests already that the area (a + b) 
should be a large amount in monetary terms. Computations for Germany show that 
traders captured 687.5 mill. DM of quota rents in 1994 at the import level. This amounts 
to 36.6 % of import expenditures of that year. No reference is made in the original pol-
icy that subsidization of firms in the marketing channel is a policy objective. Therefore, 
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these income transfers must be evaluated as being untargeted and arbitrary in terms of 
redistributive goals of economic policy. 
 
4. Rent-seeking has risen enormously due to the introduction of TRQs in general and, 
partly, as a consequence of the specific rules of quota administration. In general, firms 
had to invest time and money in understanding and applying a difficult licensing 
scheme which could have been used more effectively from the society’s point of view in 
production, processing and trading activities. Adjustment costs occurred as a conse-
quence of several changes in the regime over time. Due to the lasting trade dispute on 
the CMOB, all market participants in the EU banana economy engaged in the political 
market and in rent-seeking. PEDLER (1994) documented in detail the lobbying process 
prior to the introduction of the CMOB. Rent-seeking costs of this type are a waste of 
resources from the society’s point of view. 
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) is regarded by many econo-
mists as a major step towards international trade liberalization. A more stable and less 
distorted trade is expected from the decision on tariffication and the reduction of protec-
tion levels at least in the medium run. We show in this contribution that the actual liber-
alization steps, however, are combined with some substantial new nontariff trade barri-
ers. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are a case in point. In order to fulfil the minimum access 
rule, many countries introduced TRQs and combined tariffs with quotas.  
 
The economics of TRQ administration reveals that impacts of TRQs are often very 
similar to those of traditional quantitative restrictions. In particular, efficiency losses are 
typical. High and  arbitrary quota rents will often occur. The analysis of the Common 
Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) confirms this view very clearly. Due to the 
general introduction of TRQs on the European banana market and also as a conse-
quence of TRQ administration, an aggregate deadweight loss does exist in the banana 
economy. Hidden redistributive impacts occur which are inconsistent with the stated 
policy goals. Redistribution was also important in quantitative terms given the large 
quota rents. This induced a high degree of rent-seeking and, thus, of economic costs. 
 
We conclude that the discussion on agricultural trade liberalization should concentrate 
much more on the actual liberalization steps than it has in the past. It is certainly mis-
leading to conclude that nontariff barriers in agriculture have been declining based on 
the formal WTO definition which does not count TRQs as nontariff barriers. TRQs may 
also be very resistant to policy reforms since the incentives to defend existing quota 
rents are very strong. 
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